Abstract -This study addressed the issues of uncertainty inherent in satellite control and in optimizing the roles of the human in the combined humanhachine system unit. Three different "Types" of asks were defined. Each "Type" category was represented of the level of knowledge required to perform the task most effectively (lowhoderatehigh). Each task consists of resolving a unique satellite vehicle anomaly within pre-scripted scenarios. The role of human knowledge was examined and found to be significantly important. This result was more evident as the situation uncertainty or complexity of the task increased.
Introduction
The roles of machines and humans in space systems have perplexed system designers since the advent of their use in early 1960's. Space systems are challenging systems to study since the interface with the actual system occurs remotely over a distance of thousands of miles, where the operator never visually connects with the system that they are ultimately affecting.
In essence, there is always a "correct" solution to a satellite problem, assuming all data is complete. However, the realization that oftentimes the data is incomplete (or nondeterministic) presents an entirely new set of problems to the satellite controller.
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has wrestled with determining the most cost-effective method of performing satellite command and control (2). Frequently, system assessment consists mostly of examining the system side of
I ?
without employing human centered philosophies. However, the claim is that a more effective system can be developed and procured by optimizing the human operator knowledge level and then designing an appropriate system around them. As AFSPC moves towards the goal of space control, the problems posed to the satellite operator become increasingly more nondeterministic, meaning that they are more complex, unexplored, and are often associated with incomplete data where the anomaly cause cannot be conclusively assessed.
The systems design approach presented here involved a case study of one particular space system where the roles of human and machine could be adjusted to create a better overall unit to perform satellite commanding and control when faced with data uncertainty. A human-centered system design should strive to accomplish two objectives: 1) determine the operator knowledge level best suited to complete the task at hand, and 2) create an intelligent, intuitive and effective interface for that operator to work with. This philosophy may seem obvious; nonetheless, some of the most advanced systems lack these traits. The approach used in this study was to investigate the troubleshooting success rates of different operators of varying knowledge levels. According to Sarter [I] in his studies of the Airbus A-320, advanced automated systems required a high degree of authority and autonomy. Their resulting agent-like behavior requires increased coordination between human and machine to ensure that the system operator can maintain a high level of awareness of the activity and intentions of the automated system. This indicates that the awareness and intuition level required by the operator also supports an individual with experience and knowledge. The research indicates that automation does not give license to selecting a minimally trained or inept operator. The converse is true; when the human and machine are integrated more closely, the operator must interpret the machine at a high level and understand. the consequence of an incorrect action. Furtheknore, the operator can override the machine and troubleshoot the situation if ,an, incorrect automation sequence is suggested.
Approach and Experimental Design
A "System A versus System B" approach was used to measure the effectiveness of the existing system with that of an optimized system. The two systems has two portions: the Operating System (the satellite vehicle) and the HumanMachine (or Decision) System. The.Operating System is a deterministic system, whereas the Decision system is nondeterministic in nature due to missing or incomplete data. The theory is given that a series of inputs that are varied according to the number, rate, and complexity, we can examine how well each system (A and B) can identify each anomaly and correct it. The measures of success are the number of errors committed, the respective costs of operation (in number of persons required to do the job), efficiency (time required to properly identify and correct the problem) and accuracy. Space Operations Squadron. A survey was conducted for crew personnel to determine average time spent performing the job on the current system. This equated to the mean experience level for the control group, which was approximately two year's experience on the system T -rt w -Each of the two expert crews consised of one high-knowledge level operator who will perform all satellite functions (SVO, GSO, and ENG). The same was done for the test (expert) group, where the experience level established for the expert group with an extensive satellite engineering background was approximately 7 years (with a range of 5 to 10 years). For the expert group, there was an exceptionally small cadre of individuals who would be considered to fall into this category. Subsequently, it was impossible to sample randomly from such a small population; these members were merely selected. Each volunteer spent no more than 15 hours for simulations, and 4 hours in total to complete subjective task surveys. The crews were requested to attend a 30-minute prebriefitraining session at study start and a 15-minute out-brief at tbe study conclusion. Subjective task surveys focused only on perceived task difficulty and task ratings; no further data was collected from these surveys.
Effort was also made to ensure all crews functioned at approximately the same level of alertness. Ideally, the scenarios would be run for one crew each day, at the same time every day. Equipment was used DSP simulator, a DSP Phase 111 Vehicle Database.
Accuracy (Was the anomaly resolved?) and Efficiency (Time to resolve anomaly.) were the two response variables. for this study.
Results
Proportional Hazards Analysis purports that operators resolve Type 1 (routine tasks) anomalies 1.680 times faster on average than Type 3 (difficult complexity, nondeterministic tasks) anomalies.
Type 2 (medium complexity) anomalies were resolved in roughly the same amount of time as Type 3's (RR=0.984=1, RRCI 10.792, 1.2131) indicating that the difficulty level between anomaly difficulties of types 2 and 3 was inaccurate. In this instance, subjective data collected during the experiment will prove to be extremely useful, as anomaly difficulty should not be represented solely by resolution time. The more important main effect was knowledge. Knowledge main effects were significant at a p-value of 0.0016. This verifies there was a significant difference in resolution ability between the knowledge groups, and the hazard functions were not identical (RR=1.274, RRCl [1.095, 1.4821). This would lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in expert or standard groups' time to resolve.
Experts were 1.274 times faster overall (RRCI 11.095, 1.4821 in resolving anomalies than the standard group. Experts were also 2.140 times faster in resolving Type I anomalies than Type3's, whereas standard crews were 1.680 times faster in resolving Type1 's than Type3's. However, for Type 2 anomaly resolution, again there was not noted difference between that of resolving Type2's and Type 3's.
IV. Discussion
The data showed that was a significant difference in ability to resolve anomalies between expert and standard groups. Although there was some variation in the ability levels of the expert crews, overall they outperformed their standard counterparts. In a single time period, experts could resolve 1.28 more anomalies than standard crews.
The main effect of anomaly type shows a highly significant Effect Likelihood Ratio Test of p=O, indicating that the null hypothesis of anomaly resolution times being identical across different anomaly types should be rejected. More specifically, there was a significant difference in overall operator ability in resolving Type 1 anomalies over Type 2 or 3. Type 1 anomalies were resolved 1.69 times faster than Type 3 anomalies. There was no evidence of significant difference between Type 2 and 3 resolution times., as they were roughly in the same amount of time. This would lead the researcher to discover a new test, such as gathering Subjective Data as in the Subjective Workload Analysis Technique (SWAT) to discover the differences between Type 2 and type 3.
The intent of this research was to provide data to aid in investigating the role of human knowledge in the combined human-machine unit. The results lead to the possibilities of: I) decreasing the number of operators; 2) increasing human knowledge level (experience and training): 3) applying this derived information and knowledge in developing a new improved machine-system capability through future research.
The following outcomes are offered 1) One expert operator can surpass a crew of four standard operators' anomaly resolution capability in terms of accuracy and efficiency; 2) Train personnel for longer periods of time; 3) When assessing task difficulty, resolution time is an effective measurand.
However, gauging perceived difficulty may be necessary to determine true difficulty level and evaluate what tasks are well suited for automation.
